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Abstract
Law and food are distinct concepts, though the discipline (Law and Food) implies a relationship
worthy of study. The conjunction (“and”) creates meaning. However, its absence also conveys
meaning. For example, “meat animal” suggests that animals can be both meat and animal. This
conflation has powerful legal implications. National Meat Association v. Harris (2012) makes chillingly
plain the law’s indifference to whether a meat animal is alive or dead. This essay examines the
way supposedly humane federal practices ignore the systematic brutalization of “food animals”
as those animals get processed into marketable flesh. It concludes with some observations about
why this legal blindness exists.

Keywords
National Meat Association v. Harris, humane, meat animal, industrial agriculture, National Meat
Inspection Act, preemption, slaughterhouse, Supreme Court

I. Introduction
Even as it is conjunctive, the discipline of “Law and Food” is oppositional. Law and food
are discrete concepts yet the presence of a conjunction (“and”) implies a relationship worthy of study. Similarly, the absence of a conjunction can impart meaning as well. For
example, “and” is noticeably missing from the term “meat animal.” That absence denotes
a lack of separation between meat and animals. Indeed, within the term, meat functions as
a descriptive adjective and a noun. It suggests that an animal can simultaneously be both
meat and animal. This conflation has powerful legal implications, as evidenced in the
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Supreme Court’s decision in National Meat Association v. Harris (2012).1 Harris
addressed the issue of whether a California law regulating the slaughter of downer animals (livestock that is either too sick, too injured, or both, to walk) was preempted by
federal law. The Court’s reasoning makes chillingly plain the law’s indifference to
whether a meat animal is alive or dead.
This essay begins with a summary of the Harris case. While Harris turns mainly on
the issue of preemption (i.e. whether federal law regulating the treatment of animals at
slaughterhouses conflicts with state law, in which case federal law trumps),2 that is not
the focus here. Instead, this essay looks at how the Court elided the manner in which
supposedly humane federal practices ignore the mechanized and systematic brutalization
of “food animals” (another conjunction-less term) as they get processed from living
beings into marketable flesh. The essay concludes with some observations about why
this willful legal blindness exists and what it portends.

II. The Case
In many instances, animals arriving at the slaughterhouse cannot walk. The rigors of the
industrial food process and subsequent transport to slaughter leave them sick, injured, or
both. Because these downers represent a potential monetary loss, workers sometimes go
to extraordinary lengths (often with the complicity and encouragement of management)
to get the animals on to their feet and staggering toward the killing floor. In 2008, the
Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) released undercover video footage showing workers at the Hallmark Meat Packing Company, a slaughterhouse in California,
kicking, jabbing, using electric prods, high pressure hoses, a fork lift, and other brutal
methods in order to get downed animals to walk. That video led to the largest meat recall
in history. It also led California to amend Section 599 of its Penal Code to state (in relevant part):
(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall buy, sell, or
receive a nonambulatory animal.
(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human consumption.
(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate
action to humanely euthanize the animal.3
The National Meat Association (NMA), a trade association representing packers and
processors of livestock, filed suit against the State of California, claiming that the state
law was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA).4 The FMIA states that
animal handling requirements that are “in addition to, or different than those made under
1.
2.
3.
4.

National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 965 (2012).
U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 2.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 599f.
21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
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this [Act] may not be imposed by any State.”5 The NMA argued that this clause expressly
preempts any state law that mandates different standards for downer treatment at
slaughterhouses.
The district court granted the NMA’s request for a preliminary injunction but the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that California’s law was not
preempted because it regulates only the type of animal that can be slaughtered rather than
the inspection or slaughtering process itself.6 The NMA appealed, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. A unanimous Court, per Justice Kagan, held that the
California statute made illegal some methods of processing downer animals that are legal
under the FMIA. Consequently, it presented a clear conflict between state and federal
law and, per the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause; the state law must give way.
The preemption question (though dispositive in the case) is not the primary focus
here. Rather, this essay examines the way the Court interpreted the provisions of the
FMIA and other federal laws and regulations on its way to concluding that they guarantee humane handling.

1 Humane Rhetoric
Justice Kagan begins by noting that the FMIA was passed in 1906 in the wake of public
outcry following publication of The Jungle, by Upton Sinclair. The Jungle, though a
work of fiction, graphically depicted actual conditions in the meatpacking industry and
led to widespread public dismay. According to Kagan, the FMIA sought to alleviate public concerns by establishing procedures whereby “live animals and carcasses” would be
inspected “to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome and unfit meat and meat
food products.”7 She goes on to observe that subsequent amendments to the Act require
slaughterhouses to comply with the standards for humane handling and slaughter as laid
out in the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958 (HMSA).8
Two things about this initial paragraph are noteworthy. First, in describing the inspection standards for livestock, Kagan merges live animals and carcasses into one sentence.
She thus establishes at the outset that the law recognizes little distinction between living
and dead animals. Kagan then switches rhetorical gears to address the concerns about
animal treatment raised by the Hallmark case. Slaughterhouses, she notes, must comply
with federal standards for humane treatment set forth in the HMSA.9 Putting aside the
irony of citing a slaughter statute as the standard for humane treatment, neither the statute
nor its regulations offers much in the way of animal welfare guidelines. For instance, the
regulations note that when driving livestock, electric prods and other implements should
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

21 U.S.C. § 678. It bears noting that the statute also contains a “Savings Clause” that expressly
permits state regulation so long as it is consistent with the provisions and regulations of the
FMIA.
National Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010).
Opinion at 967, quoting Pittsburgh Melting Co. v. Totten, 248 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1918).
7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
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be used “as little as possible so as minimize excitement and injury.”10 However, the phrase
“as little as possible” gives the driver such wide latitude that the regulation becomes all
but meaningless. Furthermore, despite its name, the HMSA was primarily designed to
ease the lot of slaughterhouse workers rather than the animals being slaughtered.11
In addition, though the statute requires that animals be rendered senseless before
being shackled, hoisted and cut, the rapidity of the modern industrial kill line ensures that
there will inevitably be some inaccurate stun blows. That means that some percentage
(even 0.5% still amounts to thousands of animals) is not properly stunned. Those poorly
stunned animals are often skinned alive.12 And, while not relevant to this lawsuit, it is
nevertheless noteworthy that the HMSA excludes birds.13 Consequently, 98% of the
more than ten billion animals killed annually in the United States for food lack even the
small protections afforded by the law. In light of all this, the Court’s reliance on existing
federal law as a guarantor of humane treatment seems misplaced.
Kagan turns next to the regulatory matrix, explaining that the United States Department
of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has over 9,000
inspectors who performed “ante mortem” inspections of over 147 million head of livestock in 2010. If during the course of such inspections the inspector finds evidence of
disease or injury, that animal is labeled “U.S. Condemned.” Those downer animals must
be placed in a covered pen and cannot be dragged while conscious (although they may
be moved with “suitable” equipment). They are then killed in a separate facility, with no
part of the carcass sold for human consumption. The inspector may also designate animals with less severe conditions as “U.S. Suspect.” “Suspect” animals must be slaughtered separately following which the inspector performs a “post mortem” inspection to
determine which parts of their carcasses are fit for human consumption.14
Precious little (a covered pen and mandated senselessness during dragging) in the
Act’s language suggests humane treatment. This should not surprise. The inspecting
agency is, after all, the Food Safety and Inspection Service. Food is what animals become
once they are dead. The agency’s concern resides not with the welfare of the living animals but rather with the quality of the flesh entering the food supply. Viewed through the
FSIS’s lens, living animals might best be classified as “pre-food.” The FSIS’s mission
likely reflects public concerns. Most of the hue and cry following the HSUS undercover
video at the Hallmark California facility was not about the treatment of the animals but

10. 9 CFR § 313.2.
11. 7 U.S.C. § 1901; Pub.L. 107–171, Title X, § 10305, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 493; See also,
Jennifer L. Mariucci, ‘‘The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Deficiencies and Proposed
Amendments,’’ 4 J. Animal L. 149, 150 (2008).
12. Jennifer L. Mariucci, ‘‘The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Deficiencies and Proposed
Amendments,’’ 4 J. Animal L. 149, 156 (2008).
13. Levine v. Connor, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986
(9th Cir. 2009). See also, The Poultry Production and Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451(federal
law pertaining to the inspection and slaughter of poultry which does not provide any humane
slaughtering requirements).
14. 9 C.F.R. § 309 et seq.
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rather about the fact that meat from the animals had found its way into the nation’s school
lunch supply.
Even on its own terms, however, the FSIS fails. Kagan notes that some 9,000 inspectors inspected 147 million animals as well as an additional 126,000 “humane handling
verification procedures” and however many post-mortem inspections their 147 million
inspections required. To put these responsibilities in perspective, consider for the moment
only the initial inspections and assume that 2010 was an average year. We know that in
2010, 9,000 inspectors inspected 147,000,000 animals. That means that each inspector
inspected an average of approximately 16,330 animals. If every inspector works fortyeight weeks a year, five days per week, eight hours per day, and if we assume that all they
do is live inspect animals, then this would mean that each of them inspects slightly more
than eight animals per hour. That might seem possible if ante-mortem inspections were
all they did. But it is not all they do. Furthermore, even if it were all they did, this hourly
inspection rate does not align with the hourly kill rate at a slaughterhouse.
Take hog slaughter, for example. Depending on the distance between inspection stations, the number of inspectors on the kill line, and whether the head is attached to the
carcass, the federally set, hourly kill rate ranges from 140–253 hogs per hour. Recall that
if all the FSIS inspectors are deployed doing pre-slaughter inspections, then they are
each theoretically inspecting eight animals per hour prior to slaughter. If that number is
accurate,15 the second number seems implausible. The animals must be inspected prior
to slaughter and the inspection rate is eight animals per hour; logic and basic math dictate
that the hourly slaughter rate also should not exceed eight animals per inspector. But it
does, unless there are upwards of twenty inspectors doing pre-slaughter inspections (in
addition to those present on the kill line) at each hog slaughterhouse. And we have not
even considered the aforementioned post-mortem inspections as well as all the other
responsibilities that make up an inspector’s typical work day. Clearly, the inspectors do
many more than eight ante-mortem inspections per hour, which leads one to wonder just
how much rigor and oversight such inspections provide. The opinion ignores these questions, insisting that federal law offers ample protections to animals bound for slaughter.

2 The Law and the Opinion Self-Contradict
The first sentence of the opinion following the traditional summary sentence states: “The
FMIA regulates a broad range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure the safety of the
meat and the humane handling of animals.” This sentence sets the tone of the opinion,
declaring that both the law and the Court take such matters into account. A few paragraphs later, Kagan notes that “the FMIA additionally prescribe[s] methods for handling
animals humanely at all stages of the slaughtering process.” Shortly thereafter, having
turned her attention to the preemption question, Kagan asks us to “[c]onsider what the
two statutes [the FMIA and the challenged California law] tell a slaughterhouse to do

15. 9 C.F.R. § 310.1. Because inspection rates differ for cattle, the math here is not entirely accurate. However, the kill rate for cattle is also well over eight animals per hour (see id.) so the
degree of variance does not change the overall conclusion.
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when (as not infrequently occurs) a pig becomes injured and thus nonambulatory sometime after delivery to the slaughterhouse” (emphasis mine). So, in the space of a few
paragraphs we learn that the FMIA guarantees the humane handling of animals at slaughter facilities and that those same animals are often so badly injured subsequent to arrival
that they are rendered unable to walk.
While these two statements seem mutually exclusive, they become less incongruous
as Kagan describes what humane handling means in the context of the FMIA. Under the
FMIA, she explains, “a slaughterhouse may hold (without euthanizing) any nonambulatory pig that has not been condemned . . . And the slaughterhouse may process or butcher
such an animal’s meat for human consumption, subject to an FSIS official’s approval at
a post-mortem inspection.” Thus we learn that the FMIA, which supposedly guarantees
an animal’s humane handling upon arrival at the slaughter facility, allows animals which
have been seriously injured after their arrival to be butchered for human consumption.
Since such animals can be butchered and sold into the food supply, there exists little
disincentive for industrial meat producers and their transporters to invest in the animals’
wellbeing.
The only relevant consideration for producers is whether the animals have reached
maximal slaughter weight and are free of diseases or other issues that might impact salability. These criteria can be achieved despite housing the animals under brutal conditions.16 By contrast, California § 599f would have required producers and transporters to
ensure that the animals were at least well enough to walk. Under § 599f, if the animals
could not walk, slaughterhouses could not receive them, and the producers would have
to absorb the consequent economic loss. As Justice Kagan notes, § 599f and the FMIA
“require different things of a slaughterhouse confronted with a delivery truck containing
nonambulatory swine. The former says ‘do not receive or buy them’; the latter does not.”
Consequently, unlike the FMIA, § 599f created a de-facto financial penalty for inhumane
handling. This distinction forms the heart of the Court’s holding. California sought to
erect a regulatory deterrent to the trade of downer animals. The Court held that federal
law explicitly enabled such trade and thus the federal and state laws were in irresolvable
conflict and the state law must yield. As Kagan observes, “According to the Court of
Appeals, ‘states are free to decide which animals may be turned into meat.’ We think not”
(internal citations omitted).
How then should we interpret the Court’s statement that “[t]he FMIA addresses not
just food safety, but humane treatment as well?” It clearly does not encompass any

16. Senator Robert Byrd, in a famous speech on the Senate floor, decried the state of agricultural
animal welfare: ‘‘Our inhumane treatment of livestock is becoming widespread and more
and more barbaric. Six-hundred-pound hogs – they were pigs at one time – raised in two-foot
wide metal cages called gestation crates, in which the poor beasts are unable to turn around
or lie down in natural positions, and this way they live for months at a time. On profit-driven
factory farms, veal calves are confined to dark wooden crates so small that they are prevented
from lying down or scratching themselves. These creatures feel; they know pain. They suffer
pain just as we humans suffer pain. Egg-laying hens are confined to battery cages. Unable to
spread their wings, they are reduced to nothing more than egg-laying machines.’’ 147 Cong.
Rec. S7310 (daily ed., July 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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regulatory deterrent to animal mistreatment. Instead, humane handling means something
different in the FMIA than in other contexts. Under the FMIA, the term has little to do
with protecting animals from injury or treating them gently when such injuries occur.
Severe, pre-slaughter injuries to animals apparently are to be expected, are not inhumane, and need not interfere with the production process. In addition, injured animals
can be safely and legally processed for human consumption, thus mitigating any potential financial hardships arising from their (mis)treatment.
Accounting for the disparity between traditional notions of humane handling and the
version offered by the FMIA requires careful attention to context. As noted earlier, the
title of the law, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, offers an indication of federal regulatory
priorities. In effect, as long as the animals’ treatment does not undermine the food supply,
it is “humane.” The law seeks not to safeguard animals prior to death but to vouchsafe
that whatever they endured did not impede their smooth transition into meat. Viewed
thus, if a “humanely handled” pig is the signifier, a pathogen-free pork chop becomes the
signified. The living animal does not merit legal consideration because it has not yet fully
transformed from “meat animal” into ‘‘meat.”

3 Treating Meat Humanely
The FMIA’s interpretation of humane treatment forms part of a larger regulatory vacuum
with respect to the welfare of farmed animals. When Justice Kagan notes that the FMIA
regulates behavior once animals arrive at slaughter (they are treated humanely, we’re
told, despite their frequently becoming nonambulatory), she omits any discussion of the
animals’ treatment prior to arrival. This omission is understandable since the challenged
statute dealt with slaughterhouse regulation. Nevertheless, the condition of downer animals has much more to do with their treatment prior to arrival at the slaughterhouse than
with where their last few hours get spent.
Consider the Twenty-Eight Hour Law,17 for example. The Twenty-Eight Hour Law
requires that animals not be confined for more than twenty-eight continuous hours when
being transported across state lines in a “rail carrier, express carrier, or common carrier
(except by air or water)” without at least five hours of rest, watering and feeding.18
Putting aside the fact that for years and until only recently, the USDA maintained that the
law did not apply to trucks despite trucks forming the principal means of animal transport,19 simple math once again reveals the extent of the law’s indifference to animal
welfare.
17. Livestock Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80502.
18. 45 U.S.C. § 71 (1906); See also David J. Wolfson, ‘‘Beyond the Law,’’ 2 Animal L. 123, 125
(1996).
19. See USDA, ‘‘Cattle and Swine Trucking Guide for Exporters’’ (stating “Federal law requires
that livestock in interstate commerce be in transit for no more than 28 hours without food,
water, and rest. However, this law applies only to rail shipments.”) Available at: http://www.
ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3008268; See also, ‘‘USDA to Start
Regulating the Transport of Farmed Animals on Trucks,’’ Compassion Over Killing, 2005.
Available at: http://www.cok.net/feat/28_hour_law/
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The law states that animals may not be confined for more than twenty-eight consecutive hours without being given a rest, food and water. Phrased in the positive, that means
that animals can be confined in small cages stacked on trucks, trains, or other transport
without food and water for up to twenty-eight hours without any respite. Furthermore,
the law is almost never enforced and even if it were, the $500 fine for offenders is an
easily absorbed cost of doing business.20 Clearly, such a law was not designed with animal wellbeing in mind (something the legislative history bears out).21
As further evidence of federal regulatory disregard, one need venture no further than
the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA is the only federal law that directly addresses
animal welfare yet it specifically excludes agricultural animals from its ambit.22 This
leaves exactly no laws governing the treatment of animals used in agriculture. This lack
epitomizes what J.B. Ruhl has called the “vast anti-law”23 of industrial agriculture. It is
not that Congress is indifferent to the issues raised by factory-farming. It is rather that
Congress has deliberately chosen to ignore them. The tailoring of the AWA, the impotence of the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and the disingenuous language of the FMIA form
part of the larger phenomenon of deliberate legislative and juridical exclusion of animals
qua animals (rather than animals qua meat) from the regulatory process. This exclusion
results partly from the continued potency of Jeffersonian agrarian myths and their (mis)
use by modern agro-industry and partly from the conflation of mass production with
efficient production.
From “Right to Farm” laws at the local level to water and crop subsidies at the federal
level, the industry has successfully parleyed its image as a group of small farmers working the land against all odds and for very little money into a very potent political tool and
enormous economic gain. Agriculture enjoys significant governmental protections and
subsidies. Those gains, however, came at a cost.

III. How the Meat Animal Came About
1 Agriculture → Agribusiness: “Get Big or Get Out”
In the 1970s, Earl Butz, President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture exhorted farmers to
“get big or get out” and to regard themselves as “agribusinessmen” rather than farmers.24

20. See Robyn Mallon, ‘‘The Deplorable Standard of Living Faced by Farm Animals in America’s
Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the Corporate Farm,’’ 9 Mich.
State Univ. J of Med & L.389, 399 (2005) (explaining that even when a law protecting farm
animals exists “[t]he law is violated due to the traditional corporate attitude of wanting to
maximize profit and minimize expenses.”).
21. PL 103–272, July 5, 1994, 108 Stat 745.
22. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq., see also David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, ‘‘Foxes in the Hen
House: Animals, Agriculture & the Law,’’ p. 207, in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New
Directions, Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2005).
23. J.B. Ruhl, ‘‘Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,’’ 27 Ecology L.Q.
263, 267 (2000).
24. Op. cit., p. 52.
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A new system of price supports guaranteed farmers a set price for their corn no matter the
market price. This meant that growers had no incentive to decrease production when
demand slacked. Instead, they were spurred to grow as much as possible and dump it into
the market, which in turn caused prices to crater still more.25 As prices fell, successive
farm bills lowered the guaranteed price paid to farmers, causing them to have to grow
still more to eke out a profit. Consequently, the market became perennially glutted with
corn, small growers all but disappeared, and the need to utilize the ever-growing surplus
became ever more urgent.26
Growers began feeding the corn to animals, including cattle, whose digestive systems
cannot tolerate it without prophylactic antibiotics and other medications.27 The feed itself
was cheap but the consequences of the cattle ingesting that feed were not. From this
tangled attempt to make efficient use of what should never have been grown, the factory
farm emerged.
The story of other animals’ journeys from farm to Concentrated Animal Feedlot
Operation (CAFO) 28 is similar, albeit different in certain key respects. For example,
animal agriculture for pigs and chickens (not cattle) is highly vertically integrated.29
Growers do not own the animals and have no input into the manner in which the
animals are fed or housed.30 Growers also have little leverage with respect to the
price they are paid for their labor. They cannot command prices sufficient to cover
environmental degradation and waste disposal. As a result, these costs get externalized; they are passed along to the general public and not reflected either in the cost
of production or in the retail price of the product.31 Instead, they become hidden

25. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meats (New York:
Penguin, 2006), 52–64. See also Michael Pollan, ‘‘Farmer in Chief,’’ The New York Times,
October 9, 2008.
26. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meats (New York:
Penguin, 2006), 52–64.
27. Michael Pollan, ‘‘Power Steer,’’ The New York Times, March 31, 2002. See also The Humane
Society of the United States, ‘‘An HSUS Report: Human Health Implications of NonTherapeutic Antibiotic Use in Animal Agriculture’’ (2007). Available at: http://www.
diningatpenn.com/penn/env/poultry/poultry--hsus-human-health-report-on-antibiotics.pdf.
28. CAFOs are a type of AFO (Animal Feeding Operation). According to the EPA, an AFO is a lot
or facility where: animals have been, are or will be stabled or confined for a total of 45 days or
more in a 12 month period; and crops, vegetation, forage growth, or postharvest residues are
not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility. CAFOs are
larger version of AFOs, containing 1,000 or more animals. See Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2008). For purposes of reducing the number of acronyms, I
use the term CAFO in this essay generically to refer to all industrial livestock operations.
29. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de
Direito Animal 45 (2009), p. 53.
30. Op. cit, p. 53.
31. Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America (A Report of the
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production), p. 6.
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costs, which, along with corn subsidies, have become woven into the national tax
burden.32
In order to turn agriculture into agribusiness, growers had to embrace large commercial enterprises as superior and preferable to small-scale farming. The alternative was
replacement by others more sympathetic to the corporate goal. The stated goal: making
agriculture more efficient. The missing option – which to this day remains unentertained –
involves interrogating the utility of efficiency as a bounding principle in agriculture.
In economic terms, efficiency means getting the best possible return on an investment. Any resources spent should lead to a greater yield. In this sense, efficiency is a
fundamental principle of a market economy. However, agriculture – and specifically
animal agriculture – is not economics. While economics drives many facets of agriculture, that does not make them equivalent.
Agriculture relies on human/animal interactions, which are subsumed within the ecological web even while also forming part of the human economy. The uneasy relationship between ecological unpredictability and bottom line analytics has existed for
centuries but the twentieth century witnessed market dynamics becoming dominant. As
a result, the barnyard became the stockyard, the farmyard a CAFO, and the manure pile
a sewage lagoon.
When market efficiency displaced ecology as the foundation of agriculture, another
crucial component was lost as well. Ethics were once relevant to animal agriculture.
While the welfare of nonhuman animals was never the priority, it lies beyond cavil that
the treatment and care of animals in the days prior to industrial agriculture differed markedly from animal treatment today.
Farmers used to house and feed animals in a manner that allowed the animals a modicum of comfort and the ability to develop relationships, including with their human
custodians.33 These relationships did not necessarily maximize economic yield. They
were rather based on a set of normative guidelines (and economics) even as the ultimate
reality of the animals’ commodity status inevitably imbued that bond with a sense of
unreality.
One sees vestiges of this bifurcated relationship in agricultural education organizations like 4-H, where children are given animals to care, raise and nurture. Often, the
children grow to love these animals, even as they are raising them for meat. The culmination of their efforts usually happens at county fairs; the animals are auctioned for slaughter, leaving the children grief-stricken and heartsick, while parents and teachers crowd
around offering congratulations for a job well done.34
This complicated relationship between the children and the animals is emblematic of
the tensions underlying the traditional approach to animal husbandry. It was impossible
to escape the animals’ commodity status even as ethics demanded their decent treatment.

32. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de
Direito Animal 45 (2009), p. 53.
33. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Owning What You Eat: The Discourse of Food,’’ 4 Revista Brasileria de
Direito Animal 45 (2009).
34. Anne Hull, ‘‘The Strawberry Girls,’’ The New Yorker, August 11, 2008.
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The advent of industrial agriculture eliminated the tension within the human/animal relationship by commodifying the animals completely. Animals went from partially commoditized beings whose value could be measured both in individual terms and as units
of exchange to simple merchandise whose value derived exclusively from decreased
costs of care and increased value at alienation.
The commoditization process confers an exchange value that, in the case of “meat”
animals, gets realized through slaughter. For producers (milk cows, breeding sows, etc.),
value emerges through maximizing productivity while minimizing costs. In neither instance
does the animals’ quality of life enter the equation. Instead, economic incentive (the driver
of exchange value) lies with minimizing the expenses of maintaining the animal while
maximizing the yield resulting from its use and/or death.35 It is easy to see how this logic
leads to factory farms designed to maximize profit regardless of the impact on animals.

2 Dead Animal Welfare
The basic incompatibility between interactions predicated on ethics and those predicated
on commoditization means that relationships created through agriculture are inherently
problematic.36 Nevertheless, the ascent of the factory farm resulted less from the inexorable logic of the market than from a concerted effort to reimagine productivity as inclusive of agribusiness methods. That in turn led lawmakers and regulators to exclude
animal welfare issues that did not facilitate increased production and profit from legal
consideration. The inevitable result was a focus on the viability of the dead animal product rather than the experience of the living meat producer.37
Even as one can decry the law’s indifference to whether animals are living or dead,
the genesis of that indifference is as old as the law itself. Every first year law student
35. David N. Cassuto, ‘‘Bred Meat – The Cultural Foundation of Factory Farms,’’ 70 Law
&Contemp. Probs. 59 (2007); David N. Cassuto, ‘‘The CAFO Hothouse: Climate Change,’’
Industrial Agriculture & the Law, policy paper commissioned by the Animals & Society
Institute (2010); See also Gary Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple University
Press, 1995), p. 25; Robyn Mallon, ‘‘The Deplorable Standard of Living Faced by Farm
Animals in America’s Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the
Corporate Farm,’’ 9 Mich. State. Univ. J. of Med & L. 389, 399 (2005) (explaining that even
when a law protecting farm animals exists “[t]he law is violated due to the traditional corporate attitude of wanting to maximize profit and minimize expenses”).
36. As Marlene Halverson observes: ‘‘The ethical relationship of farmers to farm animals is
unique. The farmer must raise a living creature that is destined to an endpoint of slaughter
for food, or culling and death after a lifetime of production, without becoming cynical about
the animal’s need for a decent life while the animal is alive. The farmer must somehow raise
the animal as a commercial endeavor without regarding the animal as a mere commodity.’’
Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (Little, Brown, & Company, 2009), p. 242.
37. It’s also interesting to note that the vocabulary of animal agriculture labels humans as “producers” and the animals who actually form the food as “stock” or “food animals.” Perhaps
acknowledging the animals’ role as (involuntary) producers would permit them a degree
of agency that the food manufacturing process and the legal system could not comfortably
withstand.
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reads Pierson v. Post (1805).38 In that case, the complainant, Post, and his hounds were
in pursuit of a fox when Pierson preempted the chase by killing the fox and carrying it
off. Post sued claiming that the fox was his property and that Pierson had illegally interfered with the chase. Pierson argued that Post had never gained possession of the fox and
that therefore it was in the public domain. The question before the court was whether
Post did indeed possess the fox. The court examined authorities stretching back to
Justinian in order to determine the indicia of ownership of a wild animal. It concluded
that killing or mortally wounding the animal demonstrates control and dominion and
thereby possession. Thus, one gains ownership of a living animal by killing it.
In Post, just as in Harris, living and dead animals are legally equivalent and conflated.
Though the concept is facially bizarre, just as in Harris, it is contextually intelligible.
Hunters often claim rights to the same animal and the law requires a method for resolving such disputes. Proof of dominion or capture offers a logical means through which to
do so. However, the rule only makes sense if one accepts the principle that a living animal and a dead animal are the same thing. This is an odd concept. Living people and dead
people are fundamentally different; a corpse is not the same as a person. The same clearly
holds true for nonhumans as well. Nevertheless, the court ignores the distinction because
it is most concerned with the state of animal being (death) that has the most meaning for
human society and commerce. That state of being is similarly the focus in Harris.

IV. Conclusion
Agricultural animals are not just raised for food; they are raised as food. Their care and
treatment acquires legal relevance only inasmuch as it impacts the marketability of their
dismembered bodies. With the wellbeing of the living animal excluded from the equation, “humane standards” take on an entirely different meaning. A slaughterhouse facility
can seriously injure an animal, take in and slaughter animals already gravely sick or
injured, and process them into the human food supply, all the while treating them
humanely. This humane treatment is accomplished through the oversight of meat inspectors whose mandate has literally nothing to do with animal welfare.
And with this reality, we return to where this essay began. A meat animal is not “meat
and animal.” National Meat Association v. Harris makes plain that the law does not recognize or protect the lives of agricultural animals. An agricultural animal is meat from
the moment it is born. Thus, no conjunction is necessary. Indeed, in a very real sense,
“meat animal” is a redundancy. We should simply call them meat.
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